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MIND THE GAP: 
THE NEW CULTURE WARS
Below are three quotes, picked almost at random from a depressingly long list of 
contenders. All are public statements. The first is from last year: “Nous servons de 
la viande halal par respect pour la diversité, mais pas de poisson par respect pour 
la laïcité.” Here is another, from April of this year: “There will not be any climate 
justice without true gender equality.” Finally, just to lift the spirits and contribute to 
the gaiety of nations, here is a well-known one from 1992: “At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and 
of the mystery of human life.”
These apparently unrelated statements are linked by something more than the 
incredulity or helpless laughter they elicit. The first (quoted in Ivan Rioufoul’s excel-
lent book, De l’urgence d’être réactionnaire, PUF, 2012) is how the mayor of Stras-
bourg, Roland Ries, thought fit to explain to bemused parents why their children’s 
schools serve halal meat but refuse to serve fish on Fridays. He sounds pleased 
with his choice of words. The second is from the European Parliament resolution of 
April 2012 on the connection between gender and climate change (try to keep up): 
it having been decided that the latter clearly exacerbates the former (or possibly vice 
versa), it was resolved that “the inclusion of gender issues would in its turn provide 
an opportunity towards a more effective, stronger and fairer fight against climate 
change”, and that “in order to ensure that climate action does not increase gender 
inequalities but results in co-benefits to the situation of women”, efforts should be 
made to “mainstream and integrate gender in every step of climate policies, from 
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conception to financing, implementation and evaluation”. The third is of course San-
dra Day O’Connor’s famous take on liberty and the ‘attributes of personhood’ in 
Planned Parenthood vs Casey.
The culture wars are not what they were. True, one does wonder, with the 
sort of horrified fascination displayed by witnesses to car accidents, what mental 
contortions could have led the mayor of Strasbourg, the European Parliament and 
a Supreme Court Judge to such conclusions, and to utter in public statements which 
sound like a game of Chinese whispers gone wrong; but these examples of double-
think, surreal idiocy and – well, drivel would be a kind word, no longer strain cre-
dulity as they would have (and indeed did, in the last case) even 20 years ago; they 
are just a few among dozens we nowadays encounter every day. In the 1960s, even 
20 or 30 years ago, doublethink was not yet so ubiquitous, even on extreme Le-
ftist fringes, not to speak of the mainstream Left. The ideology of identity politics, 
‘diversity’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘toleration’ had not yet spread its tentacles over 
every aspect of life and every sphere of activity, public and private. (Indeed, the 
private, although frequently declared to be public, had not yet actually become so, 
or not quite.) The Gramscian strategy of subversion through destroying the hegemo-
ny of the dominant culture (not that, I imagine, many of those whose vague aim it 
was thought of it in quite that way) was in the blueprint stage, and ‘hegemony’ was 
a word seldom encountered in this context. Daily life – reading the paper, listening 
to the talk at dinner parties, even reading academic journals – did not yet resemble 
watching a sci-fi horror movie in which aliens take over people’s brains. And drivel 
was just drivel; it was not seen as dangerous, let alone institutionalized, drivel. 
Or so it seems with hindsight. Certainly the counter-culture was no more 
sympathetic to Christianity in general or Catholicism in particular than it is today, 
though hysterical forms of militant atheism had not yet surfaced, let alone beco-
me mainstream. Certainly Muslims were trendy, to say the least, especially black 
Muslims who went in for acts of terrorism, though neither multiculturalism nor the 
victim culture were yet fully established. The condemnation of Israel was not yet 
automatic and the new antisemitism had not yet become de rigeur at trendy dinner 
parties everywhere, although Israel was attacked as a tool of American imperialism 
just as it is today. (Jewish parents are not mentioned in the Strasbourg example, but 
it is fairly safe to assume that kosher food in Strasbourg schools suffers the same 
fate as fish on Fridays. Not that the matter would ever arise: orthodox Jews do not 
generally demand that a state school cater to their children’s religious dietary re-
quirements; they send them to private religious schools. Nor can one be certain that 
the Muslim parents actually demanded halal meals. Quite possibly they didn’t have 
to; quite possibly the mayor of Strasbourg, moved by a grotesque mixture of fear, 
servility and ideological zeal, decided to anticipate their needs.) But even if my 
hindsight is failing with age, one thing is certain: in the 1960s or the 1970s such 
things would not have been said by the mayor of Strasbourg. Or by the mayor of 
any city in Europe or the United States. Or – in the wonderful case of gender and 
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climate – by any bureaucrat (there being – O blissful days! – no Eurocrats yet). 
One can imagine something like the mayor’s statement being uttered, mutatis mu-
tandis, only in the darkest days of the Soviet Union. It seems hard, also, to imagi-
ne a Supreme Court Judge, let alone one perceived as conservative, uttering such 
a sentence – however deplorably judicially active, manipulative of the Constitution, 
left-liberal-leaning or politically usurpatory one might have thought the Court even at 
the time of, say, Roe vs Wade. And that is one of the things that have changed. 
It is hard not to mention, in this context – I mean the general context of things 
which just a few decades ago you couldn’t have made up, and which still strain 
credulity – this year’s Nobel Peace Prize to the EU. For the “advancement of peace 
and reconciliation, democracy and human rights”. (“Is it too late”, asks the London 
Daily Telegraph, “for Alfred Nobel’s heirs to ask for their money back?”) Nor the 
new French President’s plans for education, which, according to a recent speech on 
the subject, appear to involve the (gradual, we’re told) abandonment of the system 
of awarding marks. The scale of the devastation wrought by decades of misguided, 
ideologically-driven policies is at last beginning to dawn even upon some bureau-
crats in the Ministry of Education; and just as Britain is beginning – slowly, rather 
half-heartedly and to furious opposition from teachers’ unions – to try to reverse the 
damage, France, as if entirely oblivious to what has been going on elsewhere in the 
world during the past few decades, is eagerly taking up those policies. Both these 
things – the second perhaps more obviously than the first – are part of the culture 
wars today.  
The point is that, once upon a time, back in the 1960s, even the 1970s, possi-
bly the 1980s, there was a counter-culture. Today the counter-culture has become, 
with some modifications (which make it much more sinister and dangerous than the 
original), the dominant culture. It has achieved the Gramscian hegemony for which 
it strove, though of course (this being part of the plan) it continues vociferously to 
deny this, proclaiming itself the victim of right-wing conspiracies, censorship and 
discrimination – in a world where the ‘establishment’, the ‘elites’, the ‘political class’ 
(an entity which until recently did not exist either in the US or in Britain; it designated 
a phenomenon to be found mainly in France – one of those bizarre things they had on 
the continent) and the media are overwhelmingly left-liberal and politically correct. 
It is now the dominant culture which chants: “Which side are you on?” and “Hey ho, 
hey ho, Western culture’s got to go”. ‘Western Civ’, too, has been told it has to go, and 
indeed it has gone. The positions which characterized what used to be called the domi-
nant culture, or the ‘establishment’, have now become a sort of counter-culture. And 
this, chiefly, is the side in the culture wars which speaks in terms of ‘culture wars’.
The other side – the side which has now become the dominant culture – does 
not, for the most part, seem to be aware of any culture wars. It sees, or claims to see, 
the problem in terms of ‘human rights’, ‘diversity’, ‘toleration’, etc. In other words, 
the other side of the culture wars, at least its hard core, has to such an extent inter-
nalized (that is to say, been brainwashed by) its own ideological slogans and its own 
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manipulation of language for political ends that it is no longer able to perceive the 
world in the same basic categories. For them, good and evil, truth and falsity, right 
and wrong, insofar as these things are admitted to exist at all, have acquired new me-
aning; ‘human rights’, ‘toleration’, ‘equality’, ‘opportunity’, ‘diversity’, ‘democra-
cy’, ‘pluralism’, ‘consensus’, ‘inclusion’, ‘exclusion’, ‘access’ and many other terms 
indiscriminately flung about daily by politicians, journalists, activists and ideologues 
of every variety, mean something quite different from what they used to mean, and 
from what to some of us they still mean. (Insofar, that is, as they have any meaning 
at all. This, again, is not very far: they are used as slogans and in every case made to 
mean whatever the speaker would like them to mean, to an extent that would give 
even Humpty Dumpty pause.) There is no longer any common ground, and therefore 
no possibility of debate. This, at least, is the situation in Poland, Great Britain and, as 
far as I can make out, the US.
I speak above of ‘sides’. Nothing odd in that, perhaps, since we are speaking 
of culture wars, in every war there are (at least) two sides. But there is more than just 
that to this business of “sides”. Since the 1960s, attitudes have become so polarized, 
and at the same time the content over which the culture wars are fought so extensive, 
that the battlefield now consists of two sides, arrayed in ranks, baying at each other. 
‘Sides’ are all there is; we might as well all be chanting the old American commu-
nist song “Which Side Are You On?”. This chant is what all debate, all argument, 
has been reduced to. Again, this is the case in both Britain and the US, but perhaps 
most strikingly – and dismayingly – in Poland. And this is the second thing that has 
changed. 
A note on the Gramscian strategy (back in fashion at good universities eve-
rywhere: at least one well-known trendy post-modernist American professor of lite-
rature at an Ivy League college includes the work of Gramsci in his ‘Great Books’ 
course). Gramsci’s idea was that the working class, if it is to seize power, must first 
achieve hegemony over the dominant bourgeois culture by creating and imposing its 
own, a universal culture free of bourgeois superstition. No wonder Gramsci is back 
in fashion. The word ‘hegemony’, especially in combination with the word ‘culture’, 
crops up with depressing regularity in today’s postmodernist, feminist, multicultura-
list discourse. Indoctrinating the working class to destroy capitalism and attain cultu-
ral hegemony by destroying the dominant culture has a very familiar ring: substitute 
‘persecuted minority’ for ‘the working class’ and it is exactly what we have today. 
Destroying the ‘bourgeois’ culture in order to create a brave new world of universal 
values is what today’s multiculturalist discourse is all about. It is what multicultu-
ralists have in mind as they labour to invent yet more minority groups (defined by 
ethnicity, religion, race, sex, sexual orientation and whatever else they can come up 
with) which they can then label as persecuted and squeeze into the straightjacket of 
group identity. The next step is to demand special privileges for them as ‘victims’, 
thereby placing them above the law; to condemn all criticism of their behaviour, 
religion or culture as racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia etc., and to kindle in them 
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a sense of grievance, which is then carefully stoked and lovingly nurtured. Whether 
they have in fact suffered any real injury or discrimination is irrelevant; as minorities 
they are victims by definition, and the State is expected to atone for the wrongs done 
to them by the granting of privileges. This is the dominant culture today: a culture of 
grievance, victimhood and resentment. It is worth noting, in passing, that the destruc-
tion of the common culture and increased dependency on the State greatly contribute 
to the ease with which people can be manipulated – a fact which cannot have escaped 
Gramsci just as it has not escaped today’s ideologues of multiculturalism.
The word ‘hegemony’ is not a neutral one; it is laden with hatred of Western 
culture – the culture of imperialism, colonialism, capitalism and oppression. There 
can in any case be no other kind of hegemony, since hegemony is by definition enjoy-
ed by the oppressors and persecutors, the colonialists, imperialists and capitalists, not 
forgetting the patriarchy. When we superimpose the Gramscian blueprint on today’s 
culture wars, certain features common to the discourse of the various ideological 
currents in fashion today – multiculturalism, radical feminism, postmodernism and 
identity politics – emerge with stark clarity. ‘Hegemony’, ‘patriarchy’, ‘social con-
struct’, ‘colonialism’ – these are part of a common language which reflects a certain 
view of the world. And that view of the world seems to be the dominant culture today. 
One might object that the Gramscian strategy has worked only up to a point; 
that achieving cultural hegemony has not so far led to the seizing of power. But has 
it not, in a way? Western governments have to a large extent submitted to the exigen-
cies of the politically correct, so that today it is not just pious expressions of political 
correctness but active promotion of PC agendas that is obligatory. And it is obligatory 
not just in humanities departments and among the chattering classes, but among the 
‘political class’ and among left-liberal elites everywhere. Its mechanism is familiar: if 
you are so rash as to disagree with one of the tenets which form the hard, unquestio-
nable core of the PC worldview, you are beneath contempt and unfit for human 
conversation. Whatever you say, on any topic, may be simply dismissed. Just as, back 
in the days of the cold war, you were automatically condemned as a ‘cold warrior’ if 
you claimed, for instance, that such-and-such an organization was a Soviet front, or 
that the Rosenbergs (on whom more in a moment) were justly convicted, or that it 
was silly and wrong to claim moral equivalence between the US and the USSR, etc., 
so today, if you claim, for instance, that children need authority and discipline and 
competition, or that the learning of facts might not be an entirely evil, oppressive, 
discriminatory and useless thing, or that Western civilisation is neither wholly to be 
condemned nor responsible for all the world’s evils, or that ‘Western Civ’ should 
be taught at universities, or that departments of Comparative or English Literature 
should not be devoted entirely to ‘theory’, or that the current bloated form of the 
welfare state has produced a culture of dependency, or express any other forbidden 
view on any of a dismayingly vast number of topics, you are labelled a ‘fascist’. But 
more than that. As Leszek Kolakowski wrote long ago in an essay called “The Heri-
tage of the Left”, “Since a cold warrior was wrong by definition, it followed logically 
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that there were no concentration camps in the USSR”. In the same way, if today 
one expresses any of the views listed above, or scepticism about any of the other 
tenets on the PC agenda, such as gay marriage, quotas for women, the evidence for 
anthropogenic global warming, equality of outcome, equal representation for every 
conceivable ethnic, religious or racial group in every conceivable institution, and 
especially if one then ventures to suggest that such things as equality before the law, 
equality of opportunity, discipline, authority, national sovereignty etc. might be more 
useful sorts of things – one is labelled ‘extreme right’ or ‘fascist’, and it logically 
follows from this not only that all one’s opinions must be wrong, but also that certain 
facts about the world which one adduces in support of them cannot really be facts. 
So, one might say, what’s new, if such logic on the part of the Western Left 
was standard during the cold war? What is new, perhaps, is not the logic itself, but the 
frequency with which it is encountered, and most of all the huge range of subjects to 
which it is applied, where once it was confined mostly to discussions of communism 
and the Soviet Union. The extreme polarization – the reduction of world opinion to 
two sides between which there can be no rational debate –  marks another change. 
It is not just that rational debate is not felt to be needed; it is actively rejected. It is 
no longer acceptable, nowadays, to try to explain that, for example, ‘fairness’ and 
‘social justice’ are not the same thing as the rule of law, or to argue that the principle 
of equality of opportunity is superior to that of equality of outcome. It has been tried. 
It cannot be done. Rational argument itself seems to have become a ‘fascist’ way of 
going about things. 
It is worth noting in passing that for much of today’s Left, the labels ‘fascist’, 
‘extreme-right’, ‘conservative’, ‘right-wing’ and ‘evil’ have become almost syno-
nymous: to be ‘right-wing’ is considered morally repugnant, whatever the content 
of one’s supposed right-wingness; and once you are labelled ‘right-wing’ or ‘con-
servative’, ‘extreme right’ and ‘fascist’ ineluctably and indiscriminately follow. As 
a consequence all these labels are bereft of meaning – except, of course, that of being 
‘on the wrong side’. To label someone as ‘right-wing’ or ‘conservative’ is no more 
than to express disapproval. This, too, seems to mark a change. 
A brief digression about the Rosenbergs, since attitudes to them on the Left 
– attitudes to all appearances quite unchanged for over half a century, in spite of 
the evidence – mirror certain attitudes today, in a broader context. In September 
2008, the startling headline “Rosenbergs guilty!” appeared in the US press. A bit 
late, you would have thought; there was an odd feeling of déjà-vu. For most of us 
there was never much doubt of the Rosenbergs’ guilt, but for large swathes of the 
American Left their innocence was, as Ronald Radosh writes in his excellent book 
about the American Left (“Commies: A Journey Through the Old Left, the New 
Left and the Leftover Left”, Encounter Books 2001), an incontrovertible truth: 
they were innocent progressives, persecuted for their ideals and their devotion to 
peace; their conviction was an attack on free speech, an attempt to stifle indepen-
dent thought, the result of anti-communist hysteria, etc., etc. Another book by 
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Radosh and Joyce Milton (“The Rosenberg File”, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, NY 
1983) ought to have put all such doubts to rest, but – predictably, perhaps – it failed 
to do so. And even now that Morton Sobell has confessed, after more than half a cen-
tury, that both he and Rosenberg were Soviet spies (which is what those September 
2008 headlines were about), the case is unlikely to be closed in the minds of some 
of the American Left. They will continue, absurdly and irrelevantly, as they did in 
the case of Alger Hiss, saying: he meant well; he didn’t do any real harm; it was in 
a good cause.  
In the West, among the Left, the two main pillars which supported the edifi-
ce of leftist ideology during the cold war are still standing, very much like (to coin 
a phrase) two vast and trunkless legs of stone in the desert. Despite the decay of that 
colossal wreck they remain unquestionable principles, but now they support a vastly 
broader ideology. They are the principle of moral equivalence between the US and 
the Soviet Union, and the principle that communism and Nazism must never be com-
pared. The idea behind the first of these, undigested, unargued and cheerfully accep-
ted everywhere, like the VISA card, is that both were “empires”, and all empires are 
evil (although the Soviet Union far less evil than others). The idea behind the second 
is that fascism was and remains the worst of all possible evils; communism must 
therefore be a lesser evil. And in any case – all together now – the communists meant 
well. And of course the Soviet Union – let’s hear it again, nice and loud, yes, you too 
there at the back – led the fight against fascism. That crude Soviet propaganda tool, 
the myth which equated anti-fascism with Soviet communism, was extraordinarily 
successful. It justified everything. It was bolstered by another lie, distinguished by 
a logical flaw unfortunately characteristic of much leftist ideological thought, past 
and present, namely that since all those who supported the Soviet Union were against 
fascism, it followed that all those who were against fascism must support the Soviet 
Union. 
The bizarre resurgence of the second of these principles in Poland, where ‘an-
ti-communism’ has become a word not to be pronounced in polite left-wing society, 
also brings a sense of déjà-vu, but in reverse. The same people who once, in the 70s 
and 80s, expended so much effort on combating the thick layers of falsehood in the 
idea of ‘anti-anti-communism’, to which so much of the American Left was wedded, 
have now  emerged as its defenders. In post-communist Poland, which, from a deep 
fear of being perceived as backward, primitive and provincial, longs to be – and 
to be perceived as – modern, cosmopolitan and trendy, the adoption of all Western 
idées reçues, whatever their content, is obligatory. What matters most, in Poland as 
elsewhere, is being on the right side – the side of light. To be on the wrong side is to 
be on the side of darkness. Being on the side of light has two further advantages: it 
procures a pleasant feeling of moral superiority, and it eliminates the need to produce 
arguments for one’s views or to consider the consequences of whatever one is propo-
sing. Nothing as tedious as thinking is required. Being on the right side is perfectly 
sufficient (another reason rational debate has become impossible). 
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A few decades ago opinions were not so polarized, and the PC ideology 
neither as rigid nor as all-encompassing as it has become. Of course, in the 70s 
and 80s you were still pilloried as ‘right-wing’ if you ventured to express some 
support for, say, Thatcher or Reagan; but although ‘right-wing’ was certainly con-
sidered a peculiar and somewhat suspicious thing to be, it did not yet automatically 
mean  that you were evil and immoral;  it was not yet interchangeable with ‘extreme 
right’. ‘Fascist’ has of course been around as a term of abuse for a very long time (my 
husband has just pointed out to me that he was called a fascist in France back in 1967 
for reading Le Figaro), so here, again, perhaps there is not much of a change. But the 
way the term is used today does seem both more automatic and more widespread, and 
the range of attitudes perceived as right-wing to which it is applied is much wider.  
One spectacular example of how this has changed was the widely displayed 
indignation at the announcement a few years ago that the Nobel Prize for literature 
had gone to Vargas Llosa. “But he’s right-wing!” literary critics spluttered in horror 
and disbelief. And immediately, predictably, there followed, as the night the day: 
“A neo-liberal!”, “Extreme right!” –  even though the poor man is nothing of the 
kind; he is a perfectly ordinary free-market liberal. Their incredulity was genuine; 
they really seemed shocked. And of course what made it worse was that Vargas Llosa 
was an apostate, a renegade; he had been a socialist and he had renounced socialism. 
This made him particularly unpalatable. What is striking here is not just this reaction 
itself, nor just its immediacy, its ferociousness and its global nature, but the fact that 
it was expressed openly, shamelessly, as something obvious. It really seemed incon-
ceivable to the people who said these things that a right-winger, whatever his literary 
merits (and in any case his supposed right-wingness meant that he could not possibly 
have any) could deserve any kind of prize. A decade ago, certainly two, the chattering 
classes would have limited themselves to expressing their shock at dinner parties, 
among themselves; their view of the world was not yet universally acknowledged as 
something that went without saying.  
This polarization has been accompanied by two related developments. The 
first is the increasing circumscription of our freedoms: the narrowing of the spa-
ce between what is forbidden and what is mandatory. The second is the spread of 
that ideology to more and more areas of our lives. Both are consequences of the 
nature – ‘totalitarian’ is not too strong an adjective to describe it – of PC ideology, 
which naturally aims to be all-encompassing. It contrives, in a way familiar to tho-
se acquainted with Marxist dialectics, to connect everything with everything else, 
wrapping our lives in a closely-knit, stifling blanket of interdependent taboos, impo-
sitions, injunctions and bans, many of which have been enshrined in law. There seem 
very few subjects left on which one is not required to hold the PC view, from global 
warming (now known as climate change, so that cooling can fit in with the theory 
of warming – do try to keep up), GM food, quotas for women, books for children, 
habitats for polar bears and ‘sustainability’ (for just about everything – not surprisin-
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gly, given that it generally means impoverishing poor black people and enriching the 
rich white people who have thought up the sustainability schemes), to homeopathy 
(on which more below), vaccines, the reasons for hurricanes (see ‘climate change’), 
university positions for the mentally handicapped, the awfulness of religion (but only 
Christianity and Judaism), the vileness of Israel, the perfidy of the Jews, Obama’s 
ability (to include some American examples) to halt the supposed rise of the oceans 
(see ‘climate change’), the constitutionality of Obamacare (the argument for which, 
before the Supreme Court saw fit to see it as a tax, will surely go down in history as 
“the broccoli argument”), and of course (in Europe) the wonderfulness of the EU (the 
existence of which is the only thing preventing another Holocaust) and the infallibi-
lity, incorruptibility and benevolence of Euro-apparatchiks.
A word on homeopathy and why I have included it in the above list. Accom-
panying all this, and somehow correlated with it, is an alarming rise in the populari-
ty of pseudo-science and new-age gibberish on the one hand and the disinclination 
for rationality on the other. The causality involved is not (at least to me) entirely 
clear, but somewhere there is a case to be made for a connection between the aban-
donment of rationality, indeed the glorification of irrationality, and the abandonment 
of argument I mentioned earlier: where no debate is possible and views are pre-
-packaged and oven-ready, argument is neither wanted nor needed, and it would 
be odd if this were unrelated to the desire – quite visible in PC ideology – to di-
spense with rationality altogether. The belief in homeopathy is symptomatic of this. 
And homeopathy does in fact seem – on the basis of anecdotal evidence – to be 
a PC thing; attempts to ridicule it by appeals to scientific evidence are regularly met 
with sneers and outrage.
The glorification of irrationality may also be related to the many contradic-
tions inherent in PC ideology. For example: all cultures are equally valuable but 
Western culture has no value at all; there are no absolute values, but some things – 
Western culture, capitalism, Israel – are absolute evils; women are vastly superior to 
men but also entirely equal; women are defined by their biology but at the same time 
“gender” is no more than a social construct; Marxism must be retained as a guiding 
principle, but so must ecological concerns about Nature and the Planet (which are no 
more than a new form of romanticism); the number of ‘human rights’ must continue 
to increase and the emphasis on human dignity must be maintained, but no such thing 
as human nature can be conceded to exist; morality and tradition may be dismissed 
on the dubious basis of evidence from neuropsychology, but scientific evidence in 
other areas must be selectively rejected; Islam must be defended, but so must the 
decent treatment of women. This last is, it has often been pointed out, something of 
a problem for multicultural feminists, although they appear not to have realised the 
extent of it; quite possibly it will not impinge on their raised consciousness until we 
are all living under Sharia law. For the moment the contradiction between upholding, 
on the one hand, the rights of women and homosexuals and, on the other, the prin-
ciple that all cultures are equal (except of course Western culture, which is worse), 
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does not seem to bother them. But why should it, since what matters is being on the 
right side and enjoying the comfortable feeling of moral superiority that being on the 
right side procures? This, too, seems to be a development – or at least a more salient 
feature – of this stage of the culture wars. The 1980s were known, fairly or not, as the 
“me-decade”, but the appellation would suit the 2000s and 2010s very well. Saving 
the world seems of secondary importance to feeling good about wanting to.
But perhaps the most important development in the culture wars since the 
1960s is the gradual institutionalization of PC agendas. In their long march through 
the institutions, they have now succeeded in shaping government policy. And this – 
since PC ideology is by nature, like all ideologies, blind to consequences – is perhaps 
the most dangerous as well as the most striking development. Hence, in defiance of 
all reason and despite clear evidence of disastrous consequences, the adoption of 
policies – energy, educational and social policies being the most striking – that have 
brought wind farms, soaring energy bills and, in Britain over the next few years, 
ineluctable power shortages, produced two generations of illiterate and innumerate 
school-leavers, made a mockery of university degrees, stifled private enterprise 
and initiative, ghettoized minorities, fostered Islamic extremism, antisemitism and 
discrimination against Christians, drastically weakened the principle of equality 
before the law, condoned the censorship of some while protecting the privileges of 
others, and encouraged a culture of dependency, irresponsibility, victimhood and 
resentment. 
One of the more disturbing developments in this sad list is the abandonment, 
in Britain (and indeed in the US, through manipulation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), of the principle of equality before the law. 
There it goes, one feels; wave it goodbye. And once it has gone, it will be hard to re- 
-establish. In Britain it is not just that one has far fewer rights (to free speech, but not 
only that) as a Christian than one does if one is a Muslim; the penalties for a crime 
are actually tougher if it is racially or religiously motivated – a ‘hate crime’. Crimes 
motivated by the victim’s sexual orientation and disability also come into this catego-
ry. (But not crimes connected with what is known as ‘ageism’, because – as I read in 
a BBC report from February of this year – “there is no statutory definition of a crime 
against an older person”.) It comes as no surprise to learn that only a very small percen-
tage of prosecutions for hate crimes involve a white victim. It seems safe to suppose 
that an equally small percentage involve Christians and Jews. The law on hate crimes 
is vague and easily manipulated. This, from the point of view of the institutionalized 
multicultural agenda that gave rise to it, is clearly the point; except for cases of verbal 
abuse, it is hard to see how such motivation could be reliably established. I must say 
I don’t much care whether I am murdered as a Jew or an infidel or for my money. The 
State would care, though – but only if I were black or Muslim.
The consequences of the Gramscian blueprint’s legislative successes – the en-
shrinement in law of successive tenets of the now dominant PC culture – increasingly 
make themselves felt in our daily lives, most notably in the form of selective attempts 
to censor free speech. All are grotesque to varying degrees, but some to such an 
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extent that they deserve special mention. Here are a few examples – again, picked 
with difficulty from a long list of excellent candidates. 
The first is the trial, earlier this year, of Lars Hedegaard, president of the 
Danish Free Press Society, accused of violating Denmark’s hate speech laws by 
speaking of some of the less than entirely satisfactory ways in which Muslim 
women are sometimes treated by their families, with a special mention of rape and 
honour killings. He was acquitted (the judges having found no evidence of ‘intent of 
public dissemination’). Danish MP Jesper Langballe, however, who had come out in 
support of his remarks, was convicted. Thus the dissemination of facts can now be 
prosecuted as hate speech whenever the expression of those facts is deemed by the 
State to be inconvenient. The case of the Dutch politician Geert Wilders was rather 
different, involving as it did the expression of opinion – in the form of criticism of 
Islam – not the dissemination of facts: he was charged with insulting Islam and 
inciting hatred and discrimination against Muslims. He was eventually acquitted. 
Whatever the merits of the case against him, two things are worth noting. The first is 
that, while perhaps not all his actions could be considered the exercise of free speech 
and on that count deserving of protection, some, perhaps most, undoubtedly could; 
and in large part he was in fact tried for inciting debate (about taboo subjects such 
as Muslim immigration), not discrimination. The second is that one of the days of 
his trial in Amsterdam coincided with a pro-Palestinian demonstration, also in Am-
sterdam, in the course of which some of the demonstrators chanted “Jews to the gas 
chambers” and waved banners expressing the same general idea. None of them, as far 
as I know, stood trial for any offence or was ever accused of hate speech. 
Another equally well-known example that deserves mention is a British one: 
that of the Johns, a husband and wife who for many years have fostered children. 
The Johns are black, which in this case is immaterial. They are also pious Christians, 
which is not. They have always been considered excellent foster-parents. Last year 
a British court ruled that they may no longer foster children because their views were 
too ‘old-fashioned’. More specifically, they refused to indoctrinate the children in 
their care as to the superiority of homosexuality over heterosexuality. (A new British 
adoption law now requires local authorities to make sure that foster- and adoptive 
parents bring up the children in their care in an atmosphere of respect for ‘toleration’ 
and ‘diversity’. One result of this has been the closure of Catholic adoption agencies 
in Britain.) The Johns’ foster-children are all between five and ten years old. The 
Johns have never raised the subject of homosexuality with them and very much doubt 
that they would ever have occasion to do so. Nevertheless, the court found that the 
right of homosexuals to protection from discrimination trumps the right of Christians 
to the free expression of their faith and moral values. The court also saw fit to suggest 
that what was most objectionable, and potentially most harmful to the children in 
their care, was not so much the John’s faith as their moral views. 
The fact that the Johns are black no longer counts for much; the gradations in 
identity politics have changed, and being homosexual now trumps being black. But 
194 AGNIESZKA KOŁAKOWSKA
one wonders what would have happened had the Johns been Muslim. The court may 
well have reached a different verdict, if only from fear.
It is also worth mentioning that in Sweden priests have been prosecuted, and 
in some cases sentenced to terms in prison, for preaching biblical sexual morality 
in church. Similarly in Canada, where expressions of support for biblical morality, 
especially those parts of its pertaining to homosexuals, can be prosecuted as hate 
speech, even when preached in church. 
All these things are developments of the past decade of so. Few of us, I think, 
could have imagined, back in the early days of the culture wars in the 1960s, even the 
70s, how much worse things would become.
It is tempting at this point to remark that nostalgia, too, ain’t what it used 
to be – an observation hard to resist, but not entirely gratuitous for all that. We ne-
ver thought we would look back on the 1960s, even the 1970s, as an age of blithe 
innocence; all these things were in the future. No wind farms, no global warming 
industry (in the 1970s the big scare was an imminent new ice age), no radical Islam, 
multiculturalism not yet institutionalized, universities not yet entirely dedicated to 
social engineering and ideological indoctrination, humanities departments – even 
comparative literature – not yet destroyed, science respected, antisemitism not yet 
mainstream on the Left, religion – even Christianity – still accepted, though frow-
ned upon, postmodernism only just beginning, geography lessons at school still 
including maps of the world rather than concentrating on the evils of colonialism 
and anthropogenic global warming, history lessons not yet limited to enumerating 
the evils of imperialism and the exploitation of minorities, and the famous “Third 
Way” (aptly described, in a phrase which I wish I had come up with but which 
I think came from the pen of Mark Steyn, as something between the Second Coming 
and the fourth dimension) not yet every politician’s favourite currency. The failure 
to profess and teach relativism – cultural, historical, moral and of every other variety 
– was not yet enough to preclude one from a university position. The word ‘non-
-judgmental’ was not yet on everyone’s lips. The apparently limitless proliferation of 
‘rights’ (notably including the right to “define one’s own concept of…” etc.), perhaps 
the most pernicious development of all, and the most pregnant in consequences, was 
still in the future. So was the European Court of Human Rights and its perverse pre-
dilection for restraining, rather than defending, free speech. In the future, too – albeit 
the very near future – was European terrorism. Now we have come full circle and it 
is in the (very near) future once again: it seems that the trendy left-wing European 
intelligentsia is nostalgic for the days of the Baader-Meinhof gang and the Red Bri-
gades, and has apparently decided that maybe it would be fun to have another go. In 
America, universities are happily engaging in the glorification of ex-terrorists and 
providing them with professorial posts. And as academic departments go under for 
lack of funds and local authorities cancel basic services, there never seems to be any 
shortage of funds for such essentials as diversity officers, outreach enablers, racial 
equality assessors and lesbian and transgender centres. And courses on the Occupy 
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Wall Street ‘philosophy’ (courtesy of Oregon State University). And of course gender 
and queer studies.  
Finally, two more fairly recent developments must be mentioned: the new an-
tisemitism of the Left, now mainstream, and the rise of militant atheism, courtesy, to 
a large extent, of Dawkins & Hitchens. The first is more de rigeur, and more dange-
rous, then the second; the second would not be worth speaking about were it not for 
a more serious problem which it is doing its best – consciously or not – to aggravate. 
The new antisemitism of the Left, which most often, but unconvincingly, hi-
des – as it did in the old days of the Soviet era – under the cloak of “anti-Zionism”, 
is not, in fact, new at all. But in the past it was limited to leftist fringes. Today Israel 
has become indefensible in fashionable society. It is not allowed to defend itself, and 
any attempt to defend it is considered grossly ill-mannered – like blowing your nose 
in your napkin, or tearing at a dish on the table with your hands – and merits expul-
sion from polite society. (At dinner parties, the example to follow if you want to get 
on is that of the French ambassador to Great Britain, who some years ago famously 
referred to Israel as “that shitty little country”.) The Gaza strip is regularly compared 
to the Warsaw Ghetto; Israelis are compared to Nazis. NGOs (the great majority of 
them avowedly biased, some linked to terrorist organisations) and the left-liberal 
media in the West Bank and Gaza deluge the press with grossly falsified reports and 
doctored photographs of purported Israeli atrocities. Some of these people may be 
useful idiots, the innocent dupes of Palestinian propaganda; but many clearly know 
what they are doing. In France, those who a few years ago were proved in court to 
have falsified a television documentary knew exactly what they were doing. Aca-
demic boycotts are perhaps the new antisemitism’s most visible form – except for 
isolated incidents like the attempt to stage a new Kristallnacht in Rome a few years 
ago, or the recent murders of Jews in France; but these may have more to do with the 
old antisemitism than with the new. In the case of France they also clearly have to do 
with disaffected French Muslim youths (or just “youths”, are they are spoken of in 
the press, for to mention that they are Muslim would be racist); and the most recent 
murders of Jews in France were the work of a jihadist. But it is not just that there are 
boycotts; it is that people dare not refuse to join them, let alone publicly oppose them. 
It was never like this with South African grapes. Few academics are brave enough to 
utter a public condemnation of such boycotts. At UCLA, where a professor’s course 
page contained a link to a website urging a boycott of Israel, it was the brave students 
(and some faculty) who dared to protest that were condemned by the university com-
munity. That is the situation today. Much has been written in recent years about the 
rise of the new antisemitism and the reasons for it; among recent articles of interest 
are Nick Cohen’s “How the Left Turned Against the Jews” (Standpoint, Summer 
2012), Ben Cohen’s “The Big Lie Returns” (Commentary, February 2012), Ron Ra-
dosh’s “When the American Left Loved Israel” (Commentary, November 2012) and, 
again by Ron Radosh, a September 2012 column in PJ Media, which contains an 
unusually clear quote from Judith Butler, that infallible purveyor of impenetrable 
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prose and regular contributor to the gaiety of nations. But for once she couldn’t be 
clearer. Here it is, for the benefit of those who were in any doubt on the matter: “Un-
derstanding Hamas and Hezbollah as social movements that are progressive and that 
are on the left, that are part of the global left, is extremely important.” 
As for militant atheism, the problem is not its contribution to the creeping 
secularization everyone seems to be lamenting: Christianity is doing fine in many 
parts of the world and the Church of Rome, having survived for two thousand years, 
may be considered well able to take care of itself. What is disturbing is the artificial 
polarization between atheists on the one hand and Creationists on the other, as if no 
one else existed: not agnostics, not mild Church of England clergymen, not ordinary, 
rational Christians who see no conflict between science and faith and do not take the 
Bible literally. This is a real problem; and it seems to me that in the culture wars it is 
this, most of all, that should be addressed. Both Dawkins and Hitchens have proved 
in their books that their grasp of history in general, and of the history of Christianity 
more specifically, is, to put it delicately, slight; the trouble is that – in large part be-
cause the teaching of Christianity and the Bible has been long abandoned in schools 
as politically incorrect – the general reader, especially the young general reader, is 
no better placed. Christianity and the Judeo-Christian tradition, Creationists, ‘funda-
mentalist Christians’ of every variety – all are indiscriminately lumped together and 
together sneered at, reviled and blamed for all the world’s ills since the beginning of 
time. It’s just like John Lennon’s “Imagine”, but less catchy. But the division into 
atheists on one side and everyone else on the other is false, pernicious and artificial; 
and alliances with Creationists, which some conservatives seem to be tempted by, far 
from helping to preserve Christian values, seem to me misguided and dangerous – as 
alliances with one’s enemy’s enemy usually are. They should be resisted. (Come to 
that, any alliance with people who think that Adam and Eve walked the earth together 
with dinosaurs should probably be avoided.)  
A final word, in this context, about Poland, which seems to be composed of 
two extremes with a yawning abyss in the middle. On the one hand, there is the 
trendy Left – not merely anticlerical but anti-Christian, increasingly militant in its 
atheism, and much influenced by fashionable Western PC agendas. It can do post-
modernism, diversity, toleration, multiculturalism and radical feminism with the best 
of them; in its championing of gay rights and its loathing for family values it tries 
hard not be outdone. On the other, there is the Catholic right – and that seems to be 
the only right there is, give or take a handful of people. A large part of it is – to list 
a few of the thing I personally find uncongenial – in favour of a total ban on both 
abortion and IVF, against civil partnerships and genuinely discriminatory against 
homosexuals, in the sense that they would quite like to deny them equality before 
the law if they could (however much one might dislike Gay Pride marches, trying 
to ban them seems – especially now that they are an accepted spectacle in every 
European city – strategically unwise; and suggestions that homosexuals should be 
given therapy to cure them of their homosexuality would, I think, be met with in-
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credulity and distaste by most Western liberals, conservative or not). They are, if not 
actually anti-free-market, certainly not all that concerned with diminishing the role 
of the state. Unsurprisingly, they do not go out of their way to promote individual 
responsibility. An alarming amount of succumbing to the temptation to relinquish 
liberalism to the Left goes on (as it admittedly also does in the US). The gap in 
the middle seems larger, and the extremes more extreme, than elsewhere in Europe. 
I doubt whether the Catholic right, if it came to power, would prove strong enough 
– especially in the face of pressure from the EU – to implement its reforms. The 
other extreme, however – the anti-Christian PC Left, in favour of big government 
and uncritical of the EU – has a much better chance, and its influence will increase. 
Rigid and often illiberal Catholic conservatism does not seem to be the most effective 
weapon against it. 
One thing, however, the Polish Right is emphatically not, and that is antisemi-
tic. Not as a whole, not in its mainstream, and not even all that much on its fringes. 
This – because of the accusations of antisemitism regularly flung at it by the Left, 
which is unfortunately the main source of reports about Poland in the Western press 
– needs to be said very strongly, which is why it gets a paragraph to itself. Pockets of 
the old variety of antisemitism still exist, of course; but the only accusation that can 
be fairly made against the Polish Right as a whole – and it is a sufficiently serious 
one in itself – is that it is reluctant to take firm steps to stifle it when it does appear 
in its ranks.
All this is depressing to us Jewish agnostic libertarian conservatives with 
a great deal of respect for the Christian roots of Western culture. (And of course 
also to all varieties of goyish agnostic ditto.) It is not the manufactured pseudo-gap 
between religious Christians and non-believers that we should mind, or any of the 
gaps regularly deplored by the Left in its determination to ignore improvements and 
concentrate on relative conditions (a determination arising in large degree from the 
culture of resentment which it does so much to promote), such as the widening gap 
between rich and poor, or the gap – manufactured by the policies of those whose 
avowed aim was precisely to prevent it – between the kinds of education they can 
hope to receive. Of course we should and do mind these gaps, particularly the latter, 
and particularly since, being a manufactured gap, it would be fairly easily to cure. But 
those who bemoan this gap as a gap – who bemoan the gap itself, rather than the state 
of affairs occurring on one side of it – respond with cries of outrage to any genuine 
attempt to eliminate it. This confirms the suspicion that they do not really mind it at 
all: what matters most to them is the feeling of moral superiority derived from the 
conviction that they are on the right side – the side of light. To question the means 
they propose to achieve their aims is to be on the side of darkness. Here, again, is the 
blindness to consequences and the indifference to results, even if they are patently 
counter-productive, that are characteristic of ideological thinking. And here, again, 
is the culture of resentment which leads the gap-bemoaners to concentrate, in their 
policy proposals, on condemning those on the privileged side of the gap rather than 
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improving conditions for those on the other. In the case of secondary education, the 
reigning principle is that of the lowest common denominator: let them all sink, as 
long as they are equally sunk. This, too, is characteristic. Which brings me to the 
real gap.
The real gap we should mind is that yawning empty space in the centre of the 
culture wars: the gap created by the extreme polarization of opinion. It is the gap be-
tween the all-encompassing PC ideology that is obligatory today and the too rigidly 
conservative extremes of what has become, to all intents and purposes, the counter-
-culture; the gap between those on the atheist Left who contrive simultaneously to 
embrace irrationality and scientism and those on the religious Right who, in what 
sometimes seems like a childish fit of pique, reject liberalism altogether rather than 
attempting to combine it with Christian values. (This, to those of us who think it im-
portant to salvage liberalism for the Right, seems like throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater. But to them it is just bathwater, and some of them heave a sigh of relief 
as they see it go down the plughole. Their baby is elsewhere.) It is the gap between 
those who rip up Bibles in public demonstrations of loathing against religion and 
those who think it more important for schools to teach the catechism of the Church of 
Rome than the Bible; between those on the religious Right who are tempted towards 
a new form of Marcionism and those on the Left who, by rejecting the past, embrace 
a different sort of Marcionism; between those who would force the state to grant 
privileges to minority groups and those who believe that their faith forbids granting 
them equality before the law; between two extremes who in different ways reject 
individual responsibility and favour the murky and ill-defined thing they call ‘social 
justice’ over liberty. Between, in other words, two kinds of illiberalism. Perhaps libe-
ralism does ineluctably lead to the situation we have today; but we cannot be certain 
of this, and the suspicion that it does is not a good enough reason for abandoning it. 
The alternatives are worse.
Mind the gap: nowe wojny kulturowe
Autorka stawia pytanie, czy możliwe jest zracjonalizowanie dyskursu o wojnach kulturowych 
w taki sposób, aby krańcowa polaryzacja opinii została zredukowana do zrównoważonego dyskursu 
akademickiego. Zastanawia się także, czy jest możliwe znalezienie przestrzeni intelektualnej i kulturo-
wej dla powstrzymania totalitarnej doktryny poprawności politycznej oraz ekstremizmu konserwatyw-
nego, który staje się zjawiskiem kontrkulturowym, wykluczającym dyskusję akademicką.
 
